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Abstract 
This paper is a brief survey of recent empirical work on financial constraints faced by firms. It 
is organized as a series of stylized results which mirror what is generally understood about 
severity of financial constraints and effects that they have upon firms. This survey shows that 
(a) the financial constraint is a widespread key concern for firms, hindering their ability to carry 
out their optimal investment and growth trajectories and (b) the severity of such constraints 
depends on institutional and firm specific characteristics, as well as on the nature of investment 
projects. 
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1. Introduction 
What do we know about financial constraints? Theory is old and vast but only recently it did 
experience a widespread of empirical studies on firms’ financial constraints. Modigliani-Miller 
theorem tells us that external finance is a perfect substitute for internal finance, thus financial 
structure of firms and financial policy is irrelevant for its investment decisions. However, this 
will require the strong assumption of perfect capital markets which does not hold with reality – 
firms face difficulties when deciding to borrow (debt or equity). The existence of capital market 
imperfections due to information problems is well documented (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 or 
Myers and Majluf, 1984). The rationale is based on the existence of credit risk and information 
asymmetries (moral hazard and adverse selection problems) that either set the price of money 
on above-optimal levels or rationalize the credit. This inefficiency will set a wedge between 
internal and external forms of firm finance – a financing hierarchy. As a result, firms will not be 
able to raise the necessary amounts to fulfil their investment and growth goals. The severity of 
constraints and their impact will depend on firms’ and institutional characteristics as well as the 
type of investment.  
 Although the existing theoretical literature on the effect of financing constrains on 
firms’ performance is far extensive, empirical contributions seem to be rather scarce and recent. 
Nonetheless, the aim of this paper is to review the existing empirical literature on financial 
constraints, focusing on recent contributions. We shall make a brief incursion though on central 
theoretical results when needed. 
 The framework chosen to tackle this task has been to pinpoint and discuss stylized 
results that have gathered consensus among researchers. However, before we address these 
stylized results, a discussion must take place how to measure the presence of firm’s financial 
constraints. The paper will be organized as follows. Section 2 will prepare the ground for 
empirical evidence by providing a discussion over investment-cash flow sensitivities as a 
measure of financial constraints. Section 3 presents ten stylized results, while Section 4 raises 
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some practical concerns that researchers in the field might find. Section 5 will pull the pieces 
together and concludes. 
 
2. Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints: An ongoing 
debate 
Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity (hereafter ICFS) higher for financial constrained or 
unconstrained firms? This is the same as asking whether or not is high ICFS a good measure of 
the presence of firm’s financing constraints. Fazzari et al. (1988), investigate the impact of cash-
flow sensitivities on investment by classifying firms according to their dividend policy.1  The 
reason for this classification lies on the argument that “firms might pay low dividends [because] 
they require investment finance that exceeds their internal cash flow and retain all of the low-
cost internal funds they can generate”. Using a pooled regression of investment/capital stock on 
the cash-flow/capital stock ratio, estimated Q (controls for investment opportunities)2 and 
dummies for each firm and year, upon a sample consisting of 422 USA firms (1970-1984), they 
found that the coefficient of cash-flow for the low-dividend group is higher and statistically 
different than the coefficient for the high-dividend group. This suggests that low-dividend firms 
invest more of their extra cash-flow than high-dividend firms. Building on this study, a large 
body of literature investigates the presence and the impact of financing constraints through 
ICFS. Carpenter et al. (1998), who compare three measures of financial constraints (cash-flow 
sensitivity, cash stocks and coverage ratio), find evidence confirming cash-flow as the preferred 
variable to test for the presence of financing constraints. Chapman et al. (1996) also find, for 
Australian firms, that investment is less sensitive to cash-flow when firms are financially 
                                               
1
 Firms that pay low dividends are classified as financially constrained, while high-dividend firms are 
classified as unconstrained. 
2
 Q measures the increase in the present value of a firm's profits resulting from a unit increase in the firm's 
capital stock and, as a result, Q is the market value of a unit of capital. A firm invests until the cost of 
acquiring capital equals the value of capital. A high level of Q thus indicates the presence of an 
investment opportunity. It is argued that Q summarizes all future information that is relevant for a firm 
when deciding to invest. 
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unconstrained, while Bo et al. (2003), for a sample of Dutch listed firms, find that riskier firms 
face more severe financial constraints and argue that ICFS is a good proxy for financial 
constraints if “firms are classified by the degree of uncertainty they face and if the uncertainty 
originates from cost uncertainty”.3  In an interesting perspective, Almeida et al. (2004) propose 
the “propensity of firms to save cash out of cash-flows” (cash-flow sensitivity of cash) as a 
proxy for liquidity constraints, because only constrained firms will manage liquidity to 
maximise their value. They test if financially constrained firms exhibit high cash-flow 
sensitivities, while unconstrained firms do not. Results for 4/5 classification schemes for 
constrained/unconstrained firms confirm their hypothesis. Only for the classification based on 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), do the results differ.4 
 On the other hand, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that cash-flow is not a good 
measure of the existence of financing constraints and Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen’s a priori 
classification of firms is flawed. They instead classify firms according to information obtained 
from company annual reports and find evidence that constrained firms are the less sensitive to 
cash-flow.5 This argument is also supported by Kadapakkam et al. (1998) and Cleary (1999). 
Almeida and Campello (2001) draw similar conclusions. Recently, Dasgupta and Sengupta 
(2007), for Japan, find that the response of investment to cash-flow shocks is non-monotonic, 
supporting Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999). However, Allayannis and Mozumdar 
(2002) present an explanation for Cleary (1999) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argument that 
investment is more sensitive to cash-flow for less constrained firms – influential observations 
for Kaplan and Zingales and negative cash-flow observations for Cleary. 
 Recent literature has found the Investment-Cash Flow relationship to be U-shaped, 
further adding to the controversy about the interpretation of cash flow sensitivities. Examples of 
                                               
3
 Chapman et al. (1996) classify firms as financially unconstrained when a firm’s net acquisition of 
financial assets exceeds its net incurrence of equity and debt liabilities. 
4
 The classification schemes based on: payout ratio, asset size, bond rating, commercial paper rating, and 
Kaplan and Zingales index. 
5
 Kaplan and Zingales re-examine the low-dividend Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen firms and categorize 
the firms as unconstrained, possibly constrained and constrained. 
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these findings are Povel and Raith (2002), Cleary et al. (2007), Lyandres (2007), within a 
dynamic framework, and Guarilia (2008) for the UK (1993-2003 period, with 99% firms not 
traded) finds this relationship to hold for a wide range of industrial sectors.6 
 Finally, another group of literature points that cash-flows might contain information 
about firm’s investment opportunities, meaning that Q should be corrected (e.g. Chirinko, 1997; 
Erickson and Whited, 2000; Gomes, 2001; Alti, 2003; Cummings et al., 2006; and Abel and 
Eberly, 2004).7  Nonetheless, Alti (2003) finds that even after Q correction, every firms present 
sensitivity to cash-flow. In addition, Bhagat et al. (2005) find evidence that financially 
distressed firms exhibit positive investment-cash flow sensitivities if they operate at a profit, 
low sensitivity if operate at a loss and invest less than in the previous year and strong negative 
sensitivity if operate at a loss and invest more than in the previous year, while Chang et al. 
(2007) find supportive evidence for the case of Australia. 
 Overall, since Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) the debate over the 
consistency of ICFS in measuring the degree of financial constraints has been intense and is still 
open for discussion. Not only it led to a debate between the original authors (see Fazzari et al., 
2000, and Kaplan and Zingales, 2000), but it also raised a number of both theoretical and 
empirical issues related to the topic. Actually, however, the best what one can do is to classify 
firms as being constrained/unconstrained and analyse the severity of such constraints by using 
proxies. In particular, and despite not being a truly consistent measure, the IFCS technique 
seems to help clarifying the level of constraints faced by firms. 
 
                                               
6
 Agriculture, forestry and mining, manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale, hotels and 
restaurants and business and other services; excludes regulated and financial sectors. 
7
 In particular for small firms, cash-flows reveal them the direction to go in presence of growth prospects 
uncertainty. Bond et al. (1999) point that ICFS might also indicate other sources of misspecification. 
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3. Stylized results 
We were able to pinpoint ten main results that reflect the topics that suffered major contribution 
during recent years. 
 
Stylized result 1. Financial constraints are more severe for younger and smaller firms. 
 
The problems with asymmetric information in capital markets are more severe for small and 
young firms. This will happen either because there is still not much information on these firms 
available to most potential lenders, or because of “weight” and visibility of such firms. Potential 
lenders are not able to observe the “quality” of the risk or do not have control over the firm’s 
investment. Under these conditions, smaller and younger firms are expected to be more credit 
rationed, as shown by Jaffe and Russell (1976) and Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995). 
 In fact, Hyytinen and Vaananen (2006) find evidence that Finnish SMEs face severe 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems and that the former is empirically more prevalent 
than the latter. These problems, particularly the former, are found to restrict firms’ ability to 
raise external funds needed to take advantage of investment opportunities. Although 
Kadapakkam et al. (1998) and Clearly (1999), for developed countries, find the opposite 
relationship (i.e. cash flow-investment sensitivity is highest in the large firm size group and 
smallest in the small firm size group), this result can possibly arise because “larger firms have 
greater flexibility in timing their investments and have more managerial agency problems” 
(Kadapakkam et al., 1998). Pratap (2003) advances the hypothesis that adjustment costs explain 
possible insensitivity of small firms’ investment-cash flow, as firms do not take major 
investments before they attain a threshold level of liquidity.  
 Egeln et al. (1997), classifying firms into financially constrained and unconstrained, 
find evidence for Germany (1989-94) supporting greater constraints for smaller and younger 
firms.8  In addition, using a panel of small USA firms for the period 1980-92, Carpenter and 
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 Two classification schemes are used by the authors: self-evaluation and  CREDITREFORM (largest 
credit agency by the time) 
 7 
Petersen (2002) find that the typical firm retains all of its income and raises relatively little 
external finance and that, for firms that rely mostly on internal finance (90% of their sample), 
the impact of cash-flow on growth is greater than the unity, meaning that the growth of most 
small firms is constrained by internal finance. Even if for constrained firms cash-flow is 
independent of size, then growth will be independent of size, but the variance of growth rates 
will decline with size as larger firms appear to be less constrained to internal finance. Further 
supporting evidence is found in Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) who, using an unbalanced panel 
of Portuguese manufacturing firms (1990-2001), also find that smaller firms’ growth is more 
sensitive to cash-flow implying the existence of financing constraints for such firms. 
Additionally, this finding also applies for younger firms. As to the overall sample, this 
sensitivity continues to be significant but lower.9 
 Although Audretsch and Elston (2002), for the German case from 1970 to 1986, find 
that the firms which report higher ICFS are medium sized, they argue that SMEs in Germany 
appear to benefit from a bank-oriented financial system and an institutional set that prevents 
smaller firms to face greater liquidity constraints.10  Their study also confirms that very large 
firms do not appear to be liquidity constrained. In the case of Italian manufacturing firms (1989-
97), Becchetti and Trovato (2002) find that while for small firms (<50 employees) the access to 
external finance is a key limiting determinant of growth, for larger firms (>100 employees) the 
financial factor appears to be neutral. Bhaduri (2008) also reaches the same conclusions for the 
Indian manufacturing case. Finally, Budina et al. (2000) find evidence suggesting that firms in 
Bulgaria (over the period 1993-95) are financially constrained and in particular for smaller firms 
the constraints are more severe, while Honjo and Harada (2006) for a sample of Japanese 
                                               
9
 Small firms are defined as those with less than 50 employees and young firms defined as with less than 
10 years. 
10
 Note that the authors divide firms into 4 classes according to their size (<500 employees; 500-1300 
employees; 1300-5500 employees; >5500 employees) and thus the first class might be seen as small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Higher and most significant sensitivities are found for classes 2 and 3. 
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manufacturing firms during the period 1995-99, find higher growth cash flow sensitivity for 
younger SMEs, confirming Ogawa et al. (1996) earlier findings. 
 
Stylized Result 2- Size distribution of firms is skewed due to financial constraints. 
 
A set of studies concerning the evolution of firm size distribution focus on the idea that, 
contrary to the theorized by Gibrat’s Law, growth rates and growth volatility are negatively 
associated with firm size (and age). One of the explanations lies on the financial constraints 
argument – one should expect that the presence of financing constraints leads to a skewed 
distribution of firm size. Cooley and Quadrini (2001), exploring financial market frictions as in 
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1997), find that smaller firms face higher probability of default, 
take on more debt, issue more shares and pay fewer dividends, and have higher growth rates and 
volatility. So, they argue, imperfect markets will lead to a skewed size distribution of firms. 
 Using another framework, Cabral and Mata (2003) develop a model of heterogeneous 
constraints at the entrepreneur level and analyse the evolution of the distribution of firm size.11  
Their findings suggest that age has a significant influence upon the size distribution and, in 
particular, the younger firms/entrepreneurs are, the greater is the skewness of the distribution 
explained by the financial constraints.12  Faggiolo and Luzzi (2006) reach the same conclusions 
using a sample of Italian manufacturing firms during the period 1995-2000. Other studies such 
as Desai et al. (2003), for European economies in 1998, and Lotti and Santarelli (2004), for 
Italian manufacturing firms born in 1987 (followed until 1992), also support these results. 
 
Stylized Result 3- Start-ups/new entrepreneurs appear to be financially constrained. 
 
The founders of new firms, as being unable to raise the desired capital through their own 
wealth, have to apply for external finance. In order to finance such projects, banks, due to 
                                               
11
 Note that they only allow for 2 periods and use entrepreneur’s age as proxy for financial capacity. They 
argue that younger firms/entrepreneurs have higher probability of being financially constrained 
12
 Their empirical results are obtained using a sample of Portuguese manufacturing firms in 1984 and 
1991 
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information asymmetry problems, require collateral as well as minimum equity-debt ratio levels 
that in their turn are difficult to be achieved by founders. This credit rationing eventually 
hinders the creation of such firms, possibly firms whose expected returns on investment are 
higher than interest rates charged on remaining capital required. For example, Heino (2006) 
finds that, in the Mexican case, there is evidence that start-ups are financially constrained, as 
there is a strong positive relationship between probability of entering the market and 
entrepreneurs using their own personal savings to finance the initial investment. Meanwhile, 
Blumberg and Letterie (2008), through an entrepreneur perspective in an application to the 
Dutch reality, find that there are a set of characteristics that banks take into account when 
providing credit to start-ups. In particular, personal wealth, home ownership, use of own capital 
in the initial investment and earning capacity, all reduce the probability of a bank credit being 
denied. They also point out that banks tend to prefer commitments and signals when deciding to 
lend and that decisions to apply, even with potentially very profitable projects, might not occur 
due to the fact that entrepreneurs might know in advance that their project will be denied, 
according to the characteristics that banks value most (financial aspects). In another perspective, 
Bohacek (2006) finds that business families have high levels of savings that are explained by 
the incentive to overcome the financing constraint that prevents them from operating their firms 
at the optimal size. In recent papers, Magri (2008) and Nykvist (2008) find a positive 
relationship between personal wealth and entrepreneurship, respectively, in Italy and Sweden. 
 There is a body of empirical literature that points in the opposite direction. However, 
such conclusions might be flawed due to correlations between personal wealth and human 
capital. If human capital is shown to be highly correlated with personal wealth, then including 
both variables in the model might lead to the loss of explanatory power of one of them. This is 
what happened, for example, with Cressy (1996) and Kim et al. (2006), respectively for the UK 
and the USA cases. Grilo and Irigoyen (2006) also find that the perception of the lack of 
financial support has no power to explain latent entrepreneurship. Van Gelderen et al. (2006) 
find that one of the factors that affect negatively start-up success in Netherlands (1998-2001) is 
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intended start-up capital. The interpretation in this case flows from the fact that is easier to raise 
smaller amounts to start a business, whilst potential successful entrants who require larger 
amounts of initial capital and have to resort to external financing, end up compromising their 
success. 
 Finally, van Auken, (1999) and Aghion et al. (2007) find financing constraints to work 
as a barrier to entry, even after controlling for other entry barriers. The reasoning is that capital 
requirements deter entry of new firms that have limited access to funds, in particular small 
firms. 
 
Stylized Result 4- Financial constraints are determinant for firm survival. 
 
The financial constraints faced by firms can obviously have important effects on the firm’s 
ability to stay in the market. For example, Musso and Schiavo (2008) find that, for French 
manufacturing firms over the period 1996-2004, the greater the financial constraints firms face, 
the higher the probability that they do not survive and then exit the market. With respect to the 
probability of default, using a sample of Italian firms during 1996-2003, Bottazzi et al. (2007), 
find that the lower it is the credit rating of a firm, the higher is the likelihood of defaulting. Also 
analysing default probabilities, Cowling and Mitchell (2003), for the UK (1984-98), find that 
default is related to the cost of capital, with higher severity for smaller firms. 
 It is also widely accepted that the survival rate of entrants is low, which can be at least 
partially caused by financial constraints. Fotopoulos and Louri (2000) find evidence for Greek 
manufacturing firms established in 1982-84 that initial financial capital and the ratio of fixed to 
total assets significantly lowers the probability of a firm dying, while leverage increases the 
probability of death. For the Portuguese case (in the period 1985-98), in turn, Farinha (2005) 
finds that the probability of survival is lower for new firms that face financial constraints, have 
smaller initial capital, are more leveraged and have a higher number of credit relationships (as 
opposite to a stable relationship). She also points that the effects of financing constraints appear 
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to be persistent in time. Petrunia (2007) draw similar conclusions for the Canadian case (firms 
birth between 1985 and 1995). 
 Finally, financial constraints also have a negative indirect impact on firm survival. In 
fact, start-up size is generally accepted to have a positive impact on survival (smaller entrants 
face higher probabilities of failure; see for example Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995, for the 
USA, and Mata and Portugal, 1994, for Portugal) and one of the main determinants of start-
up size is external financing (see Colombo and Grilli, 2005, for the Italian case and Eisfeldt and 
Rampini, 2007, for the USA case). 
 
Stylized Result 5- R&D investment appears to be more financially constrained. 
 
The existence of financing constraints appears to be particularly severe for firms that decide to 
invest in R&D because of the risks associated with the investment. As argued before, credit 
markets will no longer be efficient, generating a wedge between internal and external financing 
faced by firms as well as a financing hierarchy. This problem is usually associated with 
Akerlof’s (1970) adverse selection in the “market for lemons” (see also Leland and Pyle, 1977, 
and Myers and Majluf, 1984, for information asymmetries in R&D financing). For example, 
Hall (1992), Hao and Jaffe (1993) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), for the USA firms, 
find support for the hypothesis that R&D investment is financially constrained in particular for 
small firms. Hall et al. (1999) in a comparative study of French, Japanese and the USA firms 
also sustain these findings, while Kukuk and Stadler (2001) find that financial constraints 
adversely affect the timing of innovations for German services firms. Czarnitzki (2006) also 
finds that, in the West Germany case, SMEs’ R&D investment is financially constrained. 
Mohnen et al. (2008) for Dutch firms in the period 2000-02 and Savignac (2009) for French 
firms in the period 1997-99 find that financial constraints significantly reduce the likelihood of 
firms having innovative activities. In the Italian case, both Scellato (2007) and Colombo and 
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Grilli (2007) find that most new technology-based firms finance their initial activities through 
founder’s wealth.  
 When compared with physical capital, R&D appears to be more financially constrained. 
As pointed by Hall (1992), due to the risky nature of R&D, firms prefer to finance their projects 
with internally generated funds. Using the same unbalanced panel of the USA firms (1959-
1991), Chiao (2002) tests this hypothesis dividing firms into two classes: science based and 
non-science based. He finds that, in fact, while there is a positive relationship of current debt 
and current physical capital investment, the relationship between current debt and current R&D 
depends on the type of industry where the firm is operating. In particular, for science based 
industries, current R&D has a negative relationship with debt. Bougheas et al. (2003) also find 
evidence of financing constraints in R&D investment in Ireland, while they do not find evidence 
of constraints for investment in physical capital. 
 
Stylized Result 6- Government policy to alleviate financial constraints seems to work. 
 
Despite the inefficiencies that public intervention might cause, subsidies through tax credits or 
grants and credit guarantees have proved to reduce substantially the severity of financial 
constraints faced by firms. Becchetti and Trovato (2002), for Italian SMEs, for example, find 
evidence that supports a positive impact of subsidies on alleviating firms’ financial constraints, 
while Li (2002) reaches the same conclusions analysing the USA Government credit subsidies 
to poor and capable entrepreneurs. Honjo and Harada (2006), for Japanese manufacturing firms 
during the period 1995-1999, also observe that public programs to foster SMEs have a high and 
positive impact in their growth. Following Hall’s (2002) suggestion that public incentives to 
R&D might have an alleviating effect on constraints, Czarnitzki (2006) investigates SMEs in 
Germany (1994, 1995 and 1998) and finds that, while in West Germany SMEs’ R&D 
investment is financially constrained, in East Germany where public subsidies seems to be the 
driving force behind R&D investment, firms appear not to suffer from external finance 
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constraints. In the case of the USA and Canadian firms, Klassen et al. (2004) observe that tax 
incentives to foster R&D have a positive impact in the R&D spending. 
 With respect to credit guarantees, Cowling and Mitchell (2003), analysing the impact of 
backed debt contracts on default probabilities for the UK firms, find that the policy undertaken 
by the Government was successful in alleviating a very real capital constraint for the majority of 
small business, while Kang and Heshmati (2008) observe that a Korean public policy providing 
credit guarantee to SMEs had significant impact on survival of the latter. Guaranteed firms had 
clear higher survival rates and better performance. Zecchini and Ventura (2009) also find that 
that Italy’s credit guarantees on credit to SMEs has reached to reduce their borrowing cost and 
easing their financing constraints. 
 
Stylized Result 7- Close bank relationships alleviate financial constraints. 
 
Close bank relationships facilitate the contact between firms and banks, reducing the 
information asymmetries, which means lower financing constraints for firms with close but few 
relationships (in particular if such relationships are stable). As Diamond (1991) argues, the risk 
associated with any particular loan is not neutral with respect to the duration of the relationship. 
As a result, one can expect differences in financial constraints between market-oriented 
economies (such as the USA and the UK) and bank-oriented ones (Germany for example). In 
fact, Fohlin (1998), in an historic perspective (1903-1911), finds that Germany's close bank 
relationships had a significant impact in reducing financing constraints. 
 Bond et al. (2003) analyse ICFS of firms in Belgium, France, Germany and the UK and 
they find that, while for Belgian firms there is no evidence of firms facing financial constraints, 
there is strong evidence suggesting that firms in the UK face severe financial constraints.13  For 
the French and German case, there still exist significant financial constraints but to a lesser 
extent than the UK case. This finding adds to the hypothesis that a bank-oriented financial 
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 Have high significant cash-flow sensitivities and strongly rejects the Euler’s equation null hypothesis of 
no financial constraints. 
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system (continental case) lightens constrains on (usually small) firms, when compared to a 
market-oriented system. The same rationale is used by Audretsch and Elston (2002), who find 
that the firms that report higher ICFS are medium sized.14  They argue that this results from the 
fact that SMEs in Germany appear to benefit from a financial system that is bank-oriented and 
an institutional set that prevents smaller firms to face greater liquidity constraints. Recently, in a 
study comparing 11 OECD Countries covering the years 1993 to 2000, Semenov (2006) also 
gives supportive evidence of the presence of greater financial constraints in market-oriented 
economies. 
 
Stylized Result 8- Firms are less financially constrained in economies with more developed 
financial markets. 
 
It has been argued that financial constraints arise with imperfect financial markets owing to 
asymmetric information between firms and finance suppliers, leading to adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems and thus to a wedge between the costs associated with internal funds and 
those associated with external finance. As a result, one can expect that firms operating in 
countries with less developed/integrated financial markets will be more exposed to the 
constraints as there will be a greater amount of frictions in the market. Oliveira and Fortunato 
(2006) point out that one of the reasons why Portuguese manufacturing firms are financially 
constrained, particularly small and young ones, might be due to a relative underdevelopment of 
capital markets in Portugal when compared to the USA or the UK (firms in Portugal rely mostly 
on banks for external finance). In the same line, Hutchinson and Xavier (2006) compare the role 
of internal finance in Slovenia (a leading transition country with still less developed financial 
markets) with the mature market economy of Belgium. They find that Slovenian firms’ growth 
is more sensitive to cash-flow than Belgian, with the sensitivity being greater for the case of 
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 Note that the authors divide firms into 4 classes according to their size (<500 employees; 500-1300 
employees; 1300-5500 employees; >5500 employees) and thus the first class might be seen as small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Higher and most significant sensitivities are found for classes 2 and 3. 
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small firms in either country. Also for Eastern European countries, Budina et al. (2000) for 
Bulgaria and Konings et al. (2003) for Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania, identify 
high ICFS, possibly indicating the presence of relevant financial constraints.15  Desai et al. 
(2003), comparing the skewness of distributions between Western, Central and Eastern Europe, 
as well as particularising for the UK case, also support these results. Hartarska and Vega (2006) 
and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008), respectively, for Russia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, find 
higher ICFS for firms that had no access to microfinance, vital in less financially developed 
economies. 
 In addition, for a sample of harmonized firm-level data for 16 industrialized and 
emerging countries,16  Aghion et al. (2007) also reinforce the importance of the development of 
financial markets in allowing the access to external finance for small firms. They also stress the 
impact that financial constraints do have for entry of small firms, working as an entry barrier. 
Meanwhile, Islam and Mozumdar (2007), for a sample of 31 countries covering the period 
1987-1997, confirm that investment is more sensitive to cash-flow for firms in economies with 
less developed financial markets. Love (2003) also supports this evidence for a sample of 40 
countries. 
 On another perspective, Haas and Peeters (2006) show that, for ten transition 
economies,17  firms increased their leverage during the transition period in order to reach their 
optimum target leverage level, despite many firms still prefer internal funding due to 
information asymmetries in the market for cash. These results imply that, before transition, 
firms were operating below optimal leverage levels and thus suffered from external finance 
constraints.  
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 Konings et al. (2003) also find that firms in Poland and Czech Republic experience higher ICFS than in 
Bulgaria and Romania (explained by soft-budget constraints). 
16
 Namely Argentina, Denmark, Chile, Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, the UK and the USA. 
17
 Namely Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Romania and Poland. 
 16 
 With respect to regional financial development, in a comparison between southern and 
northern regions of Italy, Sarno (2005) finds that SMEs in the less financially developed 
southern Italian regions are more severely affected by credit constraints. Guiso et al. (2004) also 
for the Italian case, analysing the impact of local financial development, confirm that the 
development of local financial markets has a major impact in relieving financial constraints in 
particular for smaller firms that have no access to broader capital markets. 
 
Stylized Result 9- Financial liberalization seems to alleviate financing constraints of firms, 
especially for smaller ones. 
 
In the economies were financial markets are overregulated, several inefficiencies arise due to 
information hampering along with heavy bureaucratic procedures. Usually, financial 
liberalization facilitates the access of firms to credit, specially small ones, by reducing the 
institutional barriers and transaction costs in the market for credit. Gelos and Werner (2002), for 
example, analysing the Mexican manufacturing sector for the period 1984-94, find that 
investment was generally financially constrained and that liberalization eased the access of 
small firms to external funds (note that large firms previously had a preferential treatment). 
Bhaduri (2005) and Ghosh (2006) also show that financial liberalization in India during the 
1990s alleviated financial constraints faced by manufacturing firms, in particular for small ones. 
Several other studies report that financial reform caused a reduction in financial constraints, for 
instance: Harris et al. (1994) for Indonesia, Guncavdi et al. (1998) for Turkey, Laeven (2002) 
and Koo and Maeng (2005) for Korea and Wang (2003) for Taiwan. In an opposing direction of 
liberalization, Forbes (2007) recently showed that Chilean capital controls increased financial 
constraints for small firms. 
 There is, however, some mixed empirical evidence on the effect of financial 
liberalization on firms’ investment. Laeven (2003), for a large sample of firms in 13 developing 
countries, finds that financial liberalization affects firms differently: while it relaxes financial 
constraints faced by small firms, it results on the opposite for larger ones. 
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 Finally, with respect to securities regulation, MacIntoch (1994) identified legal and 
institutional barriers to financing innovative companies in the USA and Canada. Chiu (2003) for 
Canada and Europe and Cohn (1999) for the USA also find supporting evidence of the negative 
effects of regulation in aggravating firms’ financial constraints. 
 
Stylized Result 10- Foreign-owned firms are less financially constrained than domestic ones. 
 
Firms that have access to foreign capital markets are expected to be less financially constrained 
than those that have to resort solely to national capital markets, thus facing information 
asymmetries and severe financial constraints. Ownership (national versus foreign) is believed to 
create a wedge between firms that have access to outside markets (foreign-owned) and those 
that do not. Blalock et al. (2008), for example, find evidence for Indonesia (following the 1997 
East Asian financial crisis) suggesting that firm ownership is an important determinant of 
investment as foreign ownership is associated with firms not being financially constrained. 
Colombo and Stanca (2006) also observe this wedge in budget constraints for firms in Hungary 
over the period 1989-1999. The introduction of financial reforms in the country leads domestic 
firms to face stronger constraints with respect to foreign-owned firms. Public firms (particularly 
small ones), however, were unaffected and remained under soft budget constraints. Hutchinson 
and Xavier (2006) show that foreign owned firms in Slovenia are less constrained and Ruiz-
Vargas (2000) corroborate these results for the case of Puerto Rico. Finally, Beck et al. (2006), 
using a firm-level survey conducted in 1999 and 2000 over 80 countries, find that domestic 
firms report higher financing obstacles. 
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4. Measure problems and conceptual issues 
We shall briefly address some empirical problems and conceptual issues, mostly related to data 
and sampling that are often raised when analysing financial constraints faced by firms. Firstly, 
when analysing small firms or SMEs, because of diverse definitions, it is important to precise 
what does "small" mean. Just to illustrate, a small firm might mean a firm with less than 5, 20 or 
50 employees and a “small firm” in the USA is different from a “small firm” in Europe. 
 Secondly, one must be aware of the data source and the dismal sample. Most studies 
focus solely on firms in the manufacturing sector or firms that are publicly traded (both are the 
easiest samples to obtain). This reduced samples, might generate biases if one expects to draw 
conclusions for the whole economy. As an example, if one investigates if financial constraints 
are more severe for smaller firms using traded firms it is reasonable to expect that the observed 
firms will not be as constrained as if the sample included non-traded firms. This would happen 
because traded firms have to provide extra information when quoted and then information 
asymmetries are necessarily lower for these firms.18 
 Thirdly, when analysing start-ups, it is difficult to identify potential entrants and 
obtaining their financial status information. One only observes firms that indeed overcome entry 
barriers (stressing the financial barrier). As a result, firms that did not overcome the entry 
barriers are not taken into account.  
 Fourthly, several problems emerge in survival analysis: (a) length biased sampling – if 
using stock sampling, one may not observe firm dynamics in between sample periods, thus 
survival rates tend to be larger; (b) repeated entry – one must consider de novo entry as not 
independent of previous failures (usually this is not taken into account); (c) death definition – 
firms may exit the sample even if they have not died (using two missing observations in a row 
to define death, as it is usually done, probably will not expurgate all other exits). 
                                               
18
 Kim (1999) for Korea finds that when firms decide to go traded they experience lower ICFS and that 
the financial constraint relaxation is more noticeable for smaller firms. 
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 Fifthly, several problems arise when we use ICFS to test the presence of financial 
constraints faced by firms. In particular, we must reinforce that using Q theory derived models 
might entail significant miss measurement errors due to the estimation of Q (see Poterba, 1988, 
Erickson and Whited, 2000, and Alti, 2003, for a discussion).  
 Finally, consistent financial constraints classification is a major issue of investigation. 
Financial constraints are an abstraction, so researchers use proxies such as the followings: (a) 
dividend payout ratio; (b) firm self evaluation; (c) cash stocks; (d) degree of leverage; (e) age; 
size; (f) institutional affiliation; (g) credit ratings. Most of them result from previous empirical 
findings suggesting a strong association between variables despite they can always 
questionable. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Financial constraints are a widespread key concern for firms, hindering their ability to carry 
out their optimal investment and growth trajectories. In particular, the difficulties in 
obtaining external funds seem to be highly dependent upon a firm's ownership (national 
versus foreign), age and size, as well as on a set of institutional characteristics such as 
the structure and development of the financial system. In addition, financial constraints 
appear to have a determinant impact upon firm dynamics of entry (through start-
ups/entrepreneurial activity) and exit (through firm survival), as well as on R&D 
investment. In order to alleviate these constraints, public policy, either by subsidies and 
credit guarantees or by improving financial market efficiency seems to be effective. 
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 However, financial constraint analysis is still subject to much debate as most 
empirical studies of these effects not only have to deal with a set of measurement and 
conceptual issues, but also rely upon a fragile relationship built to identify the presence 
and severity of financial constraints. Future research on the effects of financial constraints 
should aim at developing and employing more consistent measures, to then analyse the 
dynamics of firms, possibly within a Schumpeterian framework, as well as a welfare analysis of 
the impact of public incentives to lighten these constraints. 
 
 
 
 
 21 
References 
Abel, A.B. and Eberly, J.C. (2004) Q Theory without adjustment costs and cash flow effects 
without financing constraints. 2004 Meeting Papers. Society for Economic Dynamics. 
Aghion, P., Fally, T. and Scarpetta, S. (2007) Credit constraints as a barrier to the entry and 
post-entry growth of firms. Economic Policy 0(52): 731-72, 776-79. 
Akerlof, G.A. (1970) The market for 'lemons': quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3): 488-500. 
Albuquerque, R. and Hopenhayn, H.A. (2000) Optimal dynamic lending contracts with 
imperfect enforceability. RCER Working Papers. University of Rochester, Center for 
Economic Research. 
Allayannis, G. and Mozumdar, A. (2004) The impact of negative cash flow and influential 
observations on investment-cash flow sensitivity estimates. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 28(5): 901-30. 
Almeida, H. and Campello, M. (2001) Financial constraints and investment-cash flow 
sensitivities: New theoretical foundations. Working Papers. New York University. 
Almeida, H., Campello, M. and Weisbach, M.S. (2004) The cash flow sensitivity of cash. 
Journal of Finance 59(4): 1777-804. 
Alti, A. (2003) How sensitive is investment to cash flow when financing is frictionless?. 
Journal of Finance 58(2): 707-22. 
Audretsch, D.B. and Elston, J.A. (2002) Does firm size matter? Evidence on the impact of 
liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in Germany. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 20(1): 1-17. 
Audretsch, D.B. and Mahmood, T. (1995) New-firm survival: New results using a hazard 
function." Review of Economics and Statistics 77(1): 97-103. 
van Auken, H.E. (1999) Obstacles to business launch. Journal of Developmental 
Entrepreneurship 4(2): 175-87. 
Becchetti, L. and Trovato, G. (2002) The determinants of growth for small and medium sized 
firms: The role of the availability of external finance. Small Business Economics 19(4): 
291-306. 
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L. and Maksimovic, V. (2006) The determinants of 
financing obstacles. Journal of International Money and Finance 25(6): 932-52. 
Bhaduri, S.N. (2005) Investment, financial constraints and financial liberalization: Some 
stylized facts from a developing economy, India. Journal of Asian Economics 16(4): 704-
18. 
 22 
Bhaduri, S.N. (2008) Investment and capital market imperfections: Some evidence from a 
developing economy, India. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 11 
(3): 411-28. 
Bhagat, S., Moyen, N. and Suh, I. (2005) Investment and internal funds of distressed firms. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 11(3): 449-72. 
Blalock, G., Gertler, P.J. and Levine, D.I. (2008) Financial constraints on investment in an 
emerging market crisis. Journal of Monetary Economics 55(3): 568-91. 
Blumberg, B.F. and Letterie, W.A. (2008) Business starters and credit rationing. Small Business 
Economics 30(2): 187-200. 
Bo, H., Lensink, R. and Sterken, E. (2003) Uncertainty and financial constraints. European 
Finance Review 7(2): 297-321. 
Bohacek, R. (2006) Financial constraints and entrepreneurial investment. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 53(8): 2195-212. 
Bond, S., Elston, J.A., Mairesse, J. and Mulkay, B. (2003) Financial factors and investment in 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A comparison using company 
panel data. Review of Economics and Statistics 85(1): 153-65. 
Bond, S., Harhoff, D. and van Reenen, J. (1999) Investment, R&D and financial constraints in 
Britain and Germany. IFS Working Papers W99/01. Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Bottazzi, G., Grazzi, M., Secchi, A. and Tamagni, F. (2007) Assessing the impact of credit 
ratings and economic performance on firm default. LEM Papers Series 2007/15. 
Laboratory of Economics and Management, Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies. 
Bougheas, S., Görg, H. and Strobl, E. (2003) Is R&D financially constrained? Theory and 
evidence from Irish manufacturing. Review of Industrial Organization 22(2): 159-74. 
Budina, N., Garretsen, H. and de Jong, E. (2000) Liquidity constraints and investment in 
transition economies – the case of Bulgaria. Economics of Transition 8(2): 453-75. 
Cabral, L. and Mata, J. (2003) On evolution of the firm size distribution: Facts and theory. 
American Economic Review 93(4): 1075-90. 
Carpenter, R.E., Fazzari, S.M. and Petersen, B.C. (1998) Financing constraints and inventory 
investment: A comparative study with high-frequency panel data. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 80(4): 513-19. 
Carpenter, R.E. and Petersen, B.C. (2002) Is the growth of small firms constrained by internal 
finance?. Review of Economics and Statistics 84(2): 298-309. 
Chang, X., Tan, T.J., Wong, G. and Zhang, H. (2007) Effects of financial constraints on 
corporate policies in Australia. Accounting and Finance 47(1): 85-108. 
 23 
Chapman, D.R., Junor, C.W. and Stegman, T.R. (1996) Cash flow constraints and firms' 
investment behaviour. Applied Economics 28(8): 1037-47. 
Chiao, C. (2002) Relationship between debt, R&D and physical investment, evidence from US 
firm-level data. Applied Financial Economics 12(2): 105-21. 
Chirinko, R.S. (1997) Finance constraints, liquidity, and investment spending: Theoretical 
restrictions and international evidence. Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies 11(2): 185-207. 
Chiu, H.Y. (2003) Can UK small businesses obtain growth capital in the public equity markets? 
An overview of the shortcomings in UK and European securities regulation and 
considerations for reform. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 28(3): 933-77. 
Cleary, S. (1999) The relationship between firm investment and financial status. Journal of 
Finance 54(2): 673-92. 
Cleary, S., Povel, P.E. and Raith, M. (2007) The U-shaped investment curve: Theory and 
evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42(1): 1-39. 
Cohn, S.R. (1999) Impact of securities laws on developing companies: Would the Wright 
brothers have gotten off the ground?. Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 3(2), 
315-66. 
Colombo, E. and Stanca, L. (2006) Investment decisions and the soft budget constraint: 
Evidence from a large panel of Hungarian firms. Economics of Transition 14(1), 171-98. 
Colombo, M.G. and Grilli, L. (2005) Start-up size: The role of external financing. Economics 
Letters 88(2): 243-50. 
Colombo, M.G. and Grilli, L. (2007) Funding gaps? Access to bank loans by high-tech start-
ups. Small Business Economics 19(1): 25-46. 
Cooley, T.F. and Quadrini, V. (2001) Financial markets and firm dynamics. American 
Economic Review 91(5): 1286-310. 
Cowling, M. and Mitchell, P. (2003) Is the Small firms loan guarantee scheme hazardous for 
banks or helpful to small business?. Small Business Economics 21(1): 63-71. 
Cressy, R. (1996) Pre-entrepreneurial income, cash-flow growth and survival of startup 
businesses: Model and tests on U.K. Data. Small Business Economics 8(1): 49-58. 
Cummings, J.G.; Hassett, K.A. and Oliner, S.D. (2006) Investment behavior, observable 
expectations, and internal funds. American Economic Review 96(3): 796-810. 
Czarnitzki, D. (2006) Research and development in small and medium-sized enterprises: The 
role of financial constraints and public funding. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 
53(3): 335- 57. 
 24 
Dasgupta, S. and Sengupta, K. (2007) Corporate liquidity, investment and financial constraints: 
Implications from a multi-period model. Journal of Financial Intermediation 16(2): 151-
74. 
Desai, M., Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (2003) Institutions, capital constraints and entrepreneurial 
firm dynamics: Evidence from Europe. NBER Working Papers 10165. National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Diamond, D. (1991) Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly 
placed debt. Journal of Political Economy 99(4): 688-721. 
Egeln, J., Licht, G. and Steil, F. (1997) Firm foundations and the role of financial constraints. 
Small Business Economics 9(2): 137-50. 
Eisfeldt, A.L. and Rampini, A.A. (2007) New or used? Investment with credit constraints. 
Journal of Monetary Economics 54(8): 2656-81. 
Erickson, T. and Whited, T.M. (2000) Measurement error and the relationship between 
investment and Q. Journal of Political Economy 108(5): 1027-57. 
Faggiolo, G. and Luzzi, A. (2006) Do liquidity constraints matter in explaining firm size and 
growth? Some evidence from the Italian manufacturing industry. Industrial and 
Corporate Change 15(1): 1-39. 
Farinha, L. (2005) The survival of new firms: impact of idiosyncratic and environmental 
factors. Financial stability report 2005, Lisboa: Banco de Portugal. 
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard, R.G. and Petersen, B.C. (1988) Financing constraints and corporate 
investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0(1): 141-95. 
Fazzari, S.M., Hubbard, R.G. and Petersen, B.C (2000) Investment-cash flow sensitivities are 
useful: A comment on Kaplan and Zingales. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(2): 695-
705. 
Fohlin, C. (1998) Fiduciariand firm liquidity constraints: The Italian experience with German-
style universal banking. Explorations in Economic History 35(1): 83-107. 
Forbes, K.J. (2007) One cost of the Chilean capital controls: Increased financial constraints for 
smaller traded firms. Journal of International Economics 71(2): 294-323. 
Fotopoulos, G. and Louri, H. (2000) Determinants of hazard confronting new entry: Does 
financial structure matter?. Review of Industrial Organization 17(3): 285-300. 
van Gelderen, M., Thurik, R. and Bosma, N. (2006) Success and risk factors in the pre-startup 
phase. Small Business Economics 26(4): 319-35. 
Gelos, R.G. and Werner, A.M. (2002) Financial liberalization, credit constraints, and collateral: 
investment in the Mexican manufacturing sector. Journal of Development Economics 
67(1), 1-27. 
 25 
Ghosh, S. (2006) Did financial liberalization ease financing constraints? Evidence from Indian 
firm-level data. Emerging Markets Review 7(2): 176-90. 
Gomes, J.F. (2001) Financing investment. American Economic Review 91(5): 1263-85. 
Grilo, I. and Irigoyen, J.M. (2006) Entrepreneurship in the EU: To wish and not to be. Small 
Business Economics 26(4): 305-18. 
Guariglia, A. (2008) Internal financial constraints, external financial constraints, and investment 
choice: Evidence from a panel of UK firms. Journal of Banking and Finance 32(9), 1795-
809. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2004) Does local financial development matter?. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3): 929-69. 
Guncavdi, O., Bleaney, M. and McKay, A. (1998) Financial liberalization and private 
investment: Evidence from Turkey. Journal of Development Economics 57 (2): 443-55. 
de Haas, R. and Peeters, M. (2006) The dynamic adjustment towards target capital structures of 
firms in transition economies. Economics of Transition 14(1): 133-69. 
Hall, Bronwyn H. (1992) Investment and research and development at the firm level: Does the 
source of financing matter?. NBER Working Paper 4096, National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Hall, B.H. (2002) The financing of research and development. NBER Working Papers 8773, 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hall, B.H., Mairesse, J., Branstetter, L. and Crepon, B. (1999) Does cash flow cause investment 
and R&D? An exploration using panel data for French, Japanese, and United States 
Scientific firms. In D.B. Audretsch and A.R. Thurik (eds.) Innovation, Industry Evolution, 
and Employment (pp. 129-56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hao, K.Y. and Jaffe, A.B. (1993) Effect of liquidity on firms’ R&D spending. Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology 2(4): 275-82. 
Harris, J., Schiantarelli, F. and Siregar, M. (1994) The effect of financial liberalization on firms’ 
capital structure and investment decisions: Evidence from a panel of Indonesian 
manufacturing establishments, 1981–1988. World Bank Economic Review 8(1): 17-47. 
Hartarska, V. and Gonzalez-Vega, C. (2006) What affects new and established firms expansion? 
Evidence from small Firms in Russia. Small Business Economics 27(2-3): 195- 206. 
Hartarska, V. and Nadolnyak, D. (2008) An impact analysis of microfinance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. World Development 36(12): 2605-19. 
Heino, H. (2006) Use of borrowed start-up capital and micro enterprises in Mexico: Existence 
of liquidity constraints. Portuguese Economic Journal 5(1): 1-30. 
 26 
Himmelberg, C.P. and Petersen, B.C. (1994) R&D and internal finance: A panel study of small 
firms in high-tech industries. Review of Economics and Statistics 76(1): 38- 51. 
Honjo, Y. and Harada, N. (2006) SME policy, financial structure and firm growth: evidence 
from Japan. Small Business Economics 27(4): 289-300. 
Hutchinson, J. and Xavier, A. (2006) Comparing the impact of credit constraints on the growth 
of SMEs in a transition country with an established market economy. Small Business 
Economics 27(2): 169-79. 
Hyytinen, A. and Väänänen, L. (2006) Where do financial constraints originate from? An 
empirical analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets. Small 
Business Economics 27(4): 323-48. 
Islam, S.S. and Mozumdar, A. (2007) Financial market development and the importance of 
internal cash: evidence from international data. Journal of Banking and Finance 31(3), 
641-58. 
Jaffee, D.M. and Russell, T. (1976) Imperfect information, uncertainty, and credit rationing. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(4): 651-66. 
Kadapakkam, P.R, Kumar, P.C. and Riddick, L.A. (1998) The Impact of cash flows and firm 
size on investment: The international evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 22(3): 
293-320. 
Kang, J. and Heshmati, A. (2008) Effect of credit guarantee policy on survival and performance 
of SMEs in Republic of Korea. Small Business Economics 31(4): 445-62. 
Kaplan, S.N. and Zingales, L. (1997) Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful 
measures of financing constraints. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(1): 169-215. 
Kaplan, S.N. and Zingales, L. (2000) Investment-cash flow sensitivities are not valid measures 
of financing constraints. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(2): 707-12. 
Kim, J. (1999) The relaxation of financing constraints by the initial public offering of small 
manufacturing firms. Small Business Economics 12(3): 191-202. 
Kim, P., Aldrich, H. and Keister, L. (2006) Access (not) denied: The impact of financial, 
human, and cultural capital on entrepreneurial entry in the United States. Small Business 
Economics 27(1): 5-22. 
Klassen, K.J., Pittman, J.A., Reed, M.P. and Fortin, S. (2004) A cross-national comparison of 
R&D expenditure decisions: Tax incentives and financial constraints. Contemporary 
Accounting Research 21(3): 639-84. 
Konings, J., Rizov, M. and Vandenbussche, H. (2003) Investment and financial constraints in 
transition economies: Micro evidence from Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
Romania. Economics Letters 78(2): 253-58. 
 27 
Koo, J. and Maeng, K. (2005) The effect of financial liberalization on firms’ investments in 
Korea. Journal of Asian Economics 16(2): 281-97. 
Kukuk, M. and Stadler, M. (2001) Financing constraints and the timing of innovations in the 
German services sector. Empirica 28(3): 277-92. 
Laeven, L. (2002) Financial constraints on investments and credit policy in Korea. Journal of 
Asian Economics 13(2): 251-69. 
Laeven, L. (2003) Does financial liberalization reduce financing constraints?. Financial 
Management 32(1): 5-34. 
Leland, H.E. and Pyle, D.H. (1977) Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and 
financial intermediation. Journal of Finance 32(2): 371-87. 
Li, W. (2002) Entrepreneurship and government subsidies: A general equilibrium analysis. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 26(11): 1815-44. 
Lotti, F. and Santarelli, E. (2004) Industry dynamics and the distribution of firm sizes: A 
nonparametric approach. Southern Economic Journal 70(3): 443-66. 
Love, I. (2003) Financial development and financing constraints: international evidence from 
the structural investment model. Review of Financial Studies 16(3): 765-91. 
Lyandres, E. (2007) Costly external financing, investment timing, and investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Journal of Corporate Finance 13(5): 959-80. 
MacIntoch, J.G. (1994) Legal and institutional barriers to financing innovative enterprise in 
Canada. Discussion Paper 94-10. Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University. 
Magri, S. (2008) Household wealth and entrepreneurship. Bank of Italy. 
Mata, J. and Portugal, P. (1994) Life duration of new firms. Journal of Industrial Economics 
42(3): 227-45. 
Mohnen P., Palm, F.C., Loeff, S. and Tiwari, A. (2008) Financial constraints and other 
obstacles: Are they a threat to innovation activity?. De Economist 156(2): 201-214. 
Musso, P. and Schiavo, S. (2008) The impact of financial constraints on firm survival and 
growth. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 18(2): 135-49. 
Myers, S.C. and Majluf, N.S. (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms 
have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13(2): 187-
221. 
Nykvist, J. (2008) Entrepreneurship and liquidity constraints: Evidence from Sweden. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 110(1): 23-43. 
Ogawa, K., Kitasaka, S., Yamaoka, H., and Iwata, Y. (1996) Borrowing constraints and the role 
of land asset in japanese corporate investment decision. Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economies 10(2): 122-49. 
 28 
Oliveira, B. and Fortunato, A. (2006) Firm growth and liquidity constraints: A dynamic analysis  
Small Business Economics 27(2): 139-56. 
Petersen, M.A. and Rajan, R.G. (1994) The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from 
small business data. Journal of Finance 49(1): 3-37. 
Petersen, M.A. and Rajan, R.G. (1995) The effect of credit market competition on lending 
relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (2): 407-43. 
Petrunia, R. (2007) Persistence of initial debt in the long-term employment dynamics of new 
firms. Canadian Journal of Economics 40(3): 861-80. 
Poterba, J.M. (1988) Comment on ‘‘Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment’’. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0(1): 200-04. 
Povel, P. and Raith, M. (2002) Optimal investment under financial constraints: The roles of 
internal funds and asymmetric information. AFA 2002 Atlanta Meetings. 
Pratap, S. (2003) Do adjustment costs explain investment-cash flow insensitivity?. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 27(11-12): 1993-2006. 
Ruiz-Vargas, Y. (2000) Small business financing sources between immigrants and natives in 
Puerto Rico. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 40(3): 387-99. 
Sarno, D. (2005) Liquidity constraint on the production of firms in southern Italy. Small 
Business Economics 25(2): 133-46. 
Savignac, F. (2009) Impact of financial constraints on innovation: what can be learned from a 
direct measure?. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 17(6): 553-569. 
Scellato, G. (2007) Patents, firm size and financial constraints: An empirical analysis for a panel 
of Italian manufacturing firms. Cambridge Journal of Economics 31(1): 55-76. 
Semenov, R. (2006) Financial systems, financing constraints and investment: Empirical analysis 
of OECD countries. Applied Economics 38(17): 1963-74. 
Stiglitz, J.E. and Weiss, A. (1981) Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. 
American Economic Review 71(3): 393-410. 
Wang, H.J. (2003) A stochastic frontier analysis of financing constraints on investment: The 
case of financial liberalization in Taiwan. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 
21(3): 406-19. 
Zecchini, S. and Ventura, M. (2009) The impact of public guarantees on credit to SMEs. Small 
Business Economics 32(2): 191-206. 
ESTUDOS DO G.E.M.F. 
(Available  on-line at http://gemf.fe.uc.pt) 
 
2009-06 No Deep Pockets: Some stylized results on firms' financial constraints 
- Filipe Silva & Carlos Carreira 
2009-05 Aggregate and sector-specific exchange rate indexes for the Portuguese economy 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação, João Cerejeira & Miguel Portela 
2009-04 Rent Seeking at Plant Level: An Application of the Card-De La Rica Tenure Model to 
Workers in German Works Councils  
- John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira & Thomas Zwick 
2009-03 Unobserved Worker Ability, Firm Heterogeneity, and the Returns to Schooling and Training 
- Ana Sofia Lopes & Paulino Teixeira 
2009-02 Worker Directors: A German Product that Didn’t Export? 
- John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel 
2009-01 Fiscal and Monetary Policies in a Keynesian Stock-flow Consistent Model 
- Edwin Le Heron 
  
2008-08  Uniform Price Market and Behaviour Pattern: What does the Iberian Electricity Market 
Point Out  
- Vítor Marques, Isabel Soares & Adelino Fortunato 
2008-07 The partial adjustment factors of FTSE 100 stock index and stock index futures: The 
informational impact of electronic trading systems 
- Helder M. C. V. Sebastião 
2008-06 Water Losses and Hydrographical Regions Influence on the Cost Structure of the 
Portuguese Water Industry 
- Rita Martins, Fernando Coelho& Adelino Fortunato 
2008-05 The Shadow of Death: Analysing the Pre-Exit Productivity of Portuguese Manufacturing 
Firms 
- Carlos Carreira & Paulino Teixeira 
2008-04 A Note on the Determinants and Consequences of Outsourcing Using German Data 
- John T. Addison, Lutz Bellmann, André Pahnke & Paulino Teixeira 
2008-03 Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Volatility in a Target Zone: The Portuguese Case 
- António Portugal Duarte, João Sousa Andrade & Adelaide Duarte 
2008-02 Taylor-type rules versus optimal policy in a Markov-switching economy 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação & Vasco Gabriel 
2008-01 Entry and exit as a source of aggregate productivity growth in two alternative 
technological regimes 
- Carlos Carreira & Paulino Teixeira 
  
2007-09 Optimal monetary policy with a regime-switching exchange rate in a forward-looking 
model 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação & John Driffill 
2007-08 Estrutura económica, intensidade energética e emissões de CO2: Uma abordagem  
Input-Output 
- Luís Cruz & Eduardo Barata 
2007-07 The Stability and Growth Pact, Fiscal Policy Institutions, and Stabilization in Europe 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
2007-06 The Consumption-Wealth Ratio Under Asymmetric Adjustment 
- Vasco J. Gabriel, Fernando Alexandre & Pedro Bação 
2007-05 European Integration and External Sustainability of the European Union An application of 
the thesis of Feldstein-Horioka 
- João Sousa Andrade 
2007-04 Uma Aplicação da Lei de Okun em Portugal 
- João Sousa Andrade 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
2007-03 Education and growth: an industry-level analysis of the Portuguese manufacturing sector 
- Marta Simões & Adelaide Duarte 
2007-02 Levels of education, growth and policy complementarities 
- Marta Simões & Adelaide Duarte 
2007-01 Internal and External Restructuring over the Cycle: A Firm-Based Analysis of Gross Flows 
and Productivity Growth in Portugal 
- Carlos Carreira & Paulino Teixeira 
  
2006-09 Cost Structure of the Portuguese Water Industry: a Cubic Cost Function Application 
- Rita Martins, Adelino Fortunato & Fernando Coelho 
2006-08 The Impact of Works Councils on Wages 
- John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira & Thomas Zwick 
2006-07 Ricardian Equivalence, Twin Deficits, and the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle in Egypt 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
2006-06 L’intégration des marchés financiers 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
2006-05 The Integration of European Stock Markets and Market Timing 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
2006-04 Mobilidade do Capital e Sustentabilidade Externa – uma aplicação da tese de F-H a 
Portugal (1910-2004) 
- João Sousa Andrade 
2006-03 Works Councils, Labor Productivity and Plant Heterogeneity: First Evidence from Quantile 
Regressions 
- Joachim Wagner, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel & John T. Addison 
2006-02 Does the Quality of Industrial Relations Matter for the Macroeconomy? A Cross-Country 
Analysis Using Strikes Data 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
2006-01 Monte Carlo Estimation of Project Volatility for Real Options Analysis 
- Pedro Manuel Cortesão Godinho 
  
2005-17 On the Stability of the Wealth Effect 
- Fernando Alexandre, Pedro Bação & Vasco J. Gabriel 
2005-16 Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates 
- John T. Addison, C. R. Barrett & W. S. Siebert 
2005-15 Horizontal Differentiation and the survival of Train and Coach modes in medium range 
passenger transport, a welfare analysis comprising economies of scope and scale  
- Adelino Fortunato & Daniel Murta 
 
2005-14 ‘Atypical Work’ and Compensation 
- John T. Addison & Christopher J. Surfield 
 
2005-13 The Demand for Labor: An Analysis Using Matched Employer-Employee Data from the 
German LIAB. Will the High Unskilled Worker Own-Wage Elasticity Please Stand Up? 
- John T. Addison, Lutz Bellmann, Thorsten Schank & Paulino Teixeira 
 
2005-12 Works Councils in the Production Process 
- John T. Addison, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagnerd 
 
2005-11 Second Order Filter Distribution Approximations for Financial Time Series with Extreme 
Outliers 
- J. Q. Smith & António A. F. Santos 
 
2005-10 Firm Growth and Persistence of Chance: Evidence from Portuguese Microdata 
- Blandina Oliveira & Adelino Fortunato 
 
2005-09 Residential water demand under block rates – a Portuguese case study 
- Rita Martins & Adelino Fortunato 
 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
2005-08 Politico-Economic Causes of Labor Regulation in the United States: Alliances and Raising 
Rivals’ Costs (and Sometimes Lowering One’s Own) 
- John T. Addison 
 
2005-07 Firm Growth and Liquidity Constraints: A Dynamic Analysis 
- Blandina Oliveira & Adelino Fortunato 
 
2005-06 The Effect of Works Councils on Employment Change 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
 
2005-05 Le Rôle de la Consommation Publique dans la Croissance: le cas de l'Union Européenne 
- João Sousa Andrade, Maria Adelaide Silva Duarte & Claude Berthomieu 
 
2005-04 The Dynamics of the Growth of Firms: Evidence from the Services Sector 
- Blandina Oliveira & Adelino Fortunato 
 
2005-03 The Determinants of Firm Performance: Unions, Works Councils, and Employee 
Involvement/High Performance Work Practices 
- John T. Addison 
 
2005-02 Has the Stability and Growth Pact stabilised? Evidence from a panel of 12 European 
countries and some implications for the reform of the Pact 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
2005-01 Sustainability of Portuguese Fiscal Policy in Historical Perspective 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
  
2004-03 Human capital, mechanisms of technological diffusion and the role of technological shocks 
in the speed of diffusion. Evidence from a panel of Mediterranean countries 
- Maria Adelaide Duarte & Marta Simões 
 
2004-02 What Have We Learned About The Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further 
Iterations of Lazear et al. 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
 
2004-01 How the Gold Standard Functioned in Portugal: an analysis of some macroeconomic aspects 
- António Portugal Duarte & João Sousa Andrade 
 
  
2003-07 Testing Gibrat’s Law: Empirical Evidence from a Panel of Portuguese Manufacturing Firms 
- Blandina Oliveira & Adelino Fortunato 
 
2003-06 Régimes Monétaires et Théorie Quantitative du Produit Nominal au Portugal (1854-1998) 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
2003-05 Causas do Atraso na Estabilização da Inflação: Abordagem Teórica e Empírica 
- Vítor Castro 
  
2003-04 The Effects of Households’ and Firms’ Borrowing Constraints on Economic Growth 
- Maria da Conceição Costa Pereira 
 
2003-03 Second Order Filter Distribution Approximations for Financial Time Series with Extreme 
Outliers 
- J. Q. Smith & António A. F. Santos 
 
2003-02 Output Smoothing in EMU and OECD: Can We Forego Government Contribution? A risk 
sharing approach 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
2003-01 Um modelo VAR para uma Avaliação Macroeconómica de Efeitos da Integração Europeia 
da Economia Portuguesa  
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
  
Estudos do GEMF 
 
2002-08 Discrimination des facteurs potentiels de croissance et type de convergence de l’économie 
portugaise dans l’UE à travers la  spécification de la fonction de production macro-
économique. Une étude appliquée de données de panel et de séries temporelles 
- Marta Simões & Maria Adelaide Duarte 
 
2002-07 Privatisation in Portugal: employee owners or just happy employees? 
-Luís Moura Ramos & Rita Martins 
 
2002-06 The Portuguese Money Market: An analysis of the daily session 
- Fátima Teresa Sol Murta 
 
2002-05 As teorias de ciclo políticos e o caso português 
- Rodrigo Martins 
 
2002-04 Fundos de acções internacionais: uma avaliação de desempenho 
- Nuno M. Silva 
 
2002-03 The consistency of optimal policy rules in stochastic rational expectations models 
- David Backus & John Driffill 
 
2002-02 The term structure of the spreads between Portuguese and German interest rates during 
stage II of EMU 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
 
2002-01 O processo desinflacionista português: análise de alguns custos e benefícios 
- António Portugal Duarte 
 
  
2001-14 Equity prices and monetary policy: an overview with an exploratory model 
- Fernando Alexandre & Pedro Bação 
 
2001-13 A convergência das taxas de juro portuguesas para os níveis europeus durante a segunda 
metade da década de noventa 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
 
2001-12 Le rôle de l’investissement dans l’éducation sur la croissance selon différentes spécifications 
du capital humain.  
- Adelaide Duarte & Marta Simões 
 
2001-11 Ricardian Equivalence: An Empirical Application to the Portuguese Economy 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
2001-10 A Especificação da Função de Produção Macro-Económica em Estudos de Crescimento 
Económico. 
- Maria Adelaide Duarte e Marta Simões 
 
2001-09 Eficácia da Análise Técnica no Mercado Accionista Português 
- Nuno Silva 
 
2001-08 The Risk Premiums in the Portuguese Treasury Bills Interest Rates: Estimation by a 
cointegration method 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
 
2001-07 Principais factores de crescimento da economia portuguesa no espaço europeu 
- Maria Adelaide Duarte e Marta Simões 
 
2001-06 Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Co-ordination 
- Fernando Alexandre, John Driffill e Fabio Spagnolo 
 
2001-05 Labour Market Transition in Portugal, Spain, and Poland: A Comparative Perspective 
- Paulino Teixeira 
 
2001-04 Paridade do Poder de Compra e das Taxas de Juro: Um estudo aplicado a três países da 
UEM 
- António Portugal Duarte 
 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
2001-03 Technology, Employment and Wages 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
 
2001-02 Human capital investment through education and economic growth. A panel data analysis 
based on a group of Latin American countries 
- Maria Adelaide Duarte & Marta Simões 
 
2001-01 Risk Premiums in the Porutguese Treasury Bills Interest Rates from 1990 to 1998. An 
ARCH-M Approach 
- José Soares da Fonseca 
 
  
2000-08 Identificação de Vectores de Cointegração: Análise de Alguns Exemplos  
- Pedro Miguel Avelino Bação 
 
2000-07 Imunização e M-quadrado: Que relação? 
- Jorge Cunha 
 
2000-06 Eficiência Informacional nos Futuros Lisbor 3M 
- Nuno M. Silva 
 
2000-05 Estimation of Default Probabilities Using Incomplete Contracts Data 
- J. Santos Silva & J. Murteira 
 
2000-04 Un Essaie d'Application de la Théorie Quantitative de la Monnaie à l’économie portugaise, 
1854-1998 
-  João Sousa Andrade 
2000-03 Le Taux de Chômage Naturel comme un Indicateur de Politique Economique? Une 
application à l’économie portugaise 
- Adelaide Duarte & João Sousa Andrade 
 
2000-02 La Convergence Réelle Selon la Théorie de la Croissance: Quelles Explications pour l'Union 
Européenne? 
- Marta Cristina Nunes Simões 
 
2000-01 Política de Estabilização e Independência dos Bancos Centrais 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
  
1999-09 Nota sobre a Estimação de Vectores de Cointegração com os Programas CATS in RATS, 
PCFIML e EVIEWS 
- Pedro Miguel Avelino Bação 
 
1999-08 A Abertura do Mercado de Telecomunicações Celulares ao Terceiro Operador: Uma 
Decisão Racional? 
- Carlos Carreira 
 
1999-07 Is Portugal Really so Arteriosclerotic? Results from a Cross-Country Analysis of Labour 
Adjustment 
- John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira 
 
1999-06 The Effect of Dismissals Protection on Employment: More on a Vexed Theme 
- John T. Addison, Paulino Teixeira e Jean-Luc Grosso 
 
1999-05 A Cobertura Estática e Dinâmica através do Contrato de Futuros PSI-20. Estimação das 
Rácios e Eficácia Ex Post e Ex Ante 
- Helder Miguel C. V. Sebastião 
 
1999-04 Mobilização de Poupança, Financiamento e Internacionalização de Carteiras 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1999-03 Natural Resources and Environment 
- Adelaide Duarte 
 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
1999-02 L'Analyse Positive de la Politique Monétaire 
- Chistian Aubin 
 
1999-01 Economias de Escala e de Gama nos Hospitais Públicos Portugueses: Uma Aplicação da 
Função de Custo Variável Translog 
- Carlos Carreira 
 
  
1998-11 Equilíbrio Monetário no Longo e Curto Prazos - Uma Aplicação à Economia Portuguesa 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1998-10 Algumas Observações Sobre o Método da Economia 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1998-09 Mudança Tecnológica na Indústria Transformadora: Que Tipo de Viés Afinal? 
- Paulino Teixeira 
 
1998-08 Portfolio Insurance and Bond Management in a Vasicek's Term Structure of Interest Rates 
- José Alberto Soares da Fonseca 
 
1998-07 Financial Innovation and Money Demand in Portugal: A Preliminary Study 
- Pedro Miguel Avelino Bação 
 
1998-06 The Stability Pact and Portuguese Fiscal Policy: the Application of a VAR Model 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
1998-05 A Moeda Única e o Processo de Difusão da Base Monetária 
- José Alberto Soares da Fonseca 
 
1998-04 La Structure par Termes et la Volatilité des Taux d'intérêt LISBOR 
- José Alberto Soares da Fonseca 
 
1998-03 Regras de Comportamento e Reformas Monetárias no Novo SMI 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1998-02 Um Estudo da Flexibilidade dos Salários: o Caso Espanhol e Português 
- Adelaide Duarte e João Sousa Andrade 
 
1998-01 Moeda Única e Internacionalização: Apresentação do Tema 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
  
1997-09 Inovação e Aplicações Financeiras em Portugal 
- Pedro Miguel Avelino Bação 
 
1997-08 Estudo do Efeito Liquidez Aplicado à Economia Portuguesa 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1997-07 An Introduction to Conditional Expectations and Stationarity 
- Rui Manuel de Almeida 
 
1997-06 Definição de Moeda e Efeito Berlusconi 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
1997-05 A Estimação do Risco na Escolha dos Portafólios: Uma Visão Selectiva 
- António Alberto Ferreira dos Santos 
 
1997-04 A Previsão Não Paramétrica de Taxas de Rentabilidade 
- Pedro Manuel Cortesão Godinho 
 
1997-03 Propriedades Assimptóticas de Densidades 
- Rui Manuel de Almeida 
 
1997-02 Co-Integration and VAR Analysis of the Term Structure of Interest Rates: an empirical study 
of the Portuguese money and bond markets 
-João Sousa Andrade & José Soares da Fonseca 
 
Estudos do GEMF 
 
1997-01 Repartição e Capitalização. Duas Modalidades Complementares de Financiamento das 
Reformas 
- Maria Clara Murteira 
 
  
1996-08 A Crise e o Ressurgimento do Sistema Monetário Europeu 
- Luis Manuel de Aguiar Dias 
 
1996-07 Housing Shortage and Housing Investment in Portugal a Preliminary View 
- Vítor Neves 
 
1996-06 Housing, Mortgage Finance and the British Economy 
- Kenneth Gibb & Nile Istephan 
 
1996-05 The Social Policy of The European Community, Reporting Information to Employees, a U.K. 
perspective: Historical Analysis and Prognosis 
- Ken Shackleton 
 
1996-04 O Teorema da Equivalência Ricardiana: aplicação à economia portuguesa 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
 
1996-03 O Teorema da Equivalência Ricardiana: discussão teórica 
- Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro 
1996-02 As taxas de juro no MMI e a Restrição das Reservas Obrigatórias dos Bancos 
- Fátima Assunção Sol e José Alberto Soares da Fonseca 
 
1996-01 Uma Análise de Curto Prazo do Consumo, do Produto e dos Salários 
- João Sousa Andrade 
 
